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TORTS-RIGHT OF PRiVACY-INVASION OF PRIVACY THROUGH FICTIONAL WoRKs-'.-The New York Civil Rights Law prohibits the use of a person's name, portrait, or picture without his consent in writing, for advertising
or trade purposes, under penalty of civil and criminal liability.1 Plaintiff, senior
civil affairs officer of the American Military Government in the town of Licata,
Sicily, during its occupation· by Allied Armies of World War II, brought suit
under the statute against the author of the book "A Bell for Adana," and
others, 2 alleging that he occupied the position of the book's and play's principal
character, "Major Victor Jappolo" in the fictitiously named town of Adano;
and that the book and play exploited his acts, personality, and life without his
consent. Neither plaintiff's name nor picture was used in the fictitious productions. Held, with one justice dissenting, action dismissed. Toscani v. Hersey,
271 App. Div. 445, 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 814 (1946).
Although the right of privacy has not been universally recognized, it has
during. a half century's growth come to be an accepted branch of the law in
many jurisdictions.8 The greatest number of cases have involved the appropriation by one 'for his own profit of another's interest of personality as exemplified
in his name or likeness.4 Not infrequently the exploitation of the personality
interest has been, as alleged in the principal case, through the fictional media of

1 N.Y. Laws (1903) c. 132, §§ 1, 2, as amended in 19II and 1921, 8 N.Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney 1916) §§ 50, 51.
2 N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 1946, p. 27:4 reported that in this action the plaintiff
had joined as defendants the book's author, John Hersey, and publisher, Alfred A.
Knopf Co., the Playwrights Producing Company, producers of the play, and Twentieth Century Film Corporation, producers of the film.
8 A landmark in this developmel}t is Warren and Brandeis, "The Right To
Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
For the present status of the law, see Nizer, "The Right of Privacy, A Half-Century's Developments," 39 MicH. L. REv. 526 (1941).
4 PRoSSER, LAW OF TORTS,§ 107 at_p. 1056 (1941); Green, "The Right of
Privacy," 27 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1932).
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novels, stories, and moving pictures. Subject to the limitations her~inafter discussed, where the right of privacy is recognized, it is actionable to appropriate
intentionally in a work of fiction,. another's name,5 picture,6 or life incidents
wherein he is named. 7 Since fictional works are usually intended for commercial circulation, the use of one's name or likeness in this form generally satisfies
from the moment of its publication the requirement that the appropriation be for
purposes of trade or advertising. 8 The general privilege given matters of public
interest, usually associated with newspaper accounts 9 and news-reel films, 10 has
as yet not been invoked to protect the publisher of a totally fictitious production.11 But despite the natural capacity of fiction as a vehicle for invasion of
privacy, the courts have considerably contracted tlie area of liability by strict
rules of limitation. There can be no invasion of another's right of privacy without an intent to capitalize his identity; a mere similarity of names between the
fictional character and the plaintiff is not sufficient to make the publication actionable.12 There must be a substantial parallel between"the real and the fictional
5
In Kreiger v. Popular Publications, Inc., 167 Misc. 5, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 480 (1938),
defendant publisher was held to have violated plaintiff's civil rights under the New York
statute, by using the name of the plaintiff, a prominent prize fighter, over one hundred times as a "character of prominence" in a short story, "Deuces for the Duke."
8
In Semler v. Ultem Publications, Inc., 170 Misc. 551, 9 N.Y.S. (2d) 319
(1938), plaintiff, a professional model, recovered damages from defendant magazine
publisher for the unauthorized publication of a photograph of the plaintiff, dressed
in a negligee, in a magazine called "Silk Stocking Stories."
7
Plaintiff was an ex-prostitute who had been tried and acquitted of murder.
She later married and was living among friends who did not know of her past. Defendant produced and distributed a motion picture entitled "The Red Kimono,"
based upon the plaintiff's life history, in which the plaintiff's maiden name was used.
Held, that defendant had invaded plaintiff's constitutional right to pursue and obtain
happiness. Melvin v. Reid, u2 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 9r (1931).
.
In Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, r47 App. Div. 783, r32 N.Y.S. 237
(19u), affd., 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. r1O8 (1913), L.R.A. 1915C 839,'the court
held that a film re-enactment of the first rescue at sea resulting from a radio SOS call
violated the right of privacy of the wireless operator. The plaintiff's picture and name
were used in the moving picture and his part was played by a professional actor.
8
8 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, r916) §§ 50, 5r; Semler v. Ultem Publications, Inc., r7O Misc. 55r, 9 N.Y.S. (2d) 319 (1938); Kreiger v. Popular Publications, Inc., 167 Misc. 5, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 480 (r938).
9
Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y.S. 38,2 (r937)
(picture of a magician used \.yith an article on the Hindu Rope Trick).
10 Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y.S. 752
(r919), where defendant's news reel portrayed plaintiff, woman attorney, in her investigation and solution of a murder mystery; Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc. 235
App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y.S. 800 (1932), where in a factual movie short of New York
City plaintiff peddlar was photographed in a close up while selling bread and rolls on
a street corner.
11
The privilege was asserted by defendant and denied by the court in Binns v.
Vitagraph Co., of America, supra, note 7.
·
12 Nebb v. Bell Syndicate, Inc., (D.C.N.Y. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 929, where the
court dismissed the suit of one Rudy Nebb of Georgia, who alleged that his name had
been used as the principal character of the comic strip "The Nebbs," in violation of
the New York Civil Rights Law. The defendant had never heard of plaintiff before
his action was brought.
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persons, although the plaintiff's name be used 18 or incidents unmistakenly taken
from his life be depicted.14 An attempt has been made to place stage and assumed names outside the protection afforded the right of privacy.15 The right
is further limited by the rule of de minimis non curat lex: for incidental use of a
name or picture, in a novel 16 or movie,17 where the impression upon the public
is 'trifling, recovery has been denied. The principal case marks a further qualification upon the right of privacy by a jurisdiction which has consistently construed its privacy statute strictly.18 In effect, the decision suggests that it is unlawful to exploit another's personality by a pictorial description, but not by a
word description; 19 that the right of privacy may be invaded freely and without liability by an exploiter who need only be careful to omit publication of the
picture or name of his subject. It will be interesting to see whether this doctrine
will be accepted by courts which have not confined the right of privacy in a
straight-jacket of statutory construction, but have worked it into the fabric of
their common law. 20
Ira M. Price, II
18
In Swacker v. Wright, 154 Misc. 822, 277 N.Y.S. 296 (1935), although the
name of the plaintiff, an attorney, was given a minor character who was secretary to the
district attorney in a novel, the court found no parallel between the real and fictional
"Frank Swacker."
14
In Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1944) 57 F. Supp. 40,
plaintiff, former wife of George M. Cohan, brought action under the New York Civil
Rights Law against the producer of a fictional biographic movie of the life of Cohan
called ''Yankee Doodle Dandy," in which Mrs. Cohan was portrayed and incidents
which occurred during the marriage of plaintiff and Cohan were depicted. The court
held that the motion picture did not "sufficiently portray" the plaintiff to sustain her
suit.
15
Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp.' 195.
But see Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 891,
where the fictitious name, "Aunt Jemima," of pancake flour fame, was held to come
within the protection afforded by the New York Civil Rights Law, although the suit
was dismissed on other grounds.
16
Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 133 Misc. 302, 231 N.Y.S. 444 (1928),
affd. without opinion, 226 App. Div. 796, 234 N.Y.S. 773 (1929).
17
Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N.Y.S.
829 (1915).
18 Undoubtedly the penal features of the statute, although rarely invoked, have
contributed to the statute's strict construction by the New York courts. See, for example, Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y.S. 752
(1919), cited at note 10, supra.
19 The court distinguished Binns v. Vitagraph Co.- of America, 147 App. Div.
783, 132 N.Y.S. 237 1 (1911), affd., 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913), L.R.A.
1915C (note 7, supra) on the ground that "in the present case, no living person was
named and no picture or other similar likeness of anybody was used." Principal case at
815. The dissenting judge argued that a "picture," under the statute, was not limited
to a photograph but included any representation of the person. This view is the general rule in the field of defamation, w'here the plaintiff may recover by proof that the
defamatory matter referred to him, though he is not named or pictured. Youssoupoff v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., (Ct. App. 1934) 50 T.L.R. 581; Colvard v. Black, 110 Ga. 642, 36 S.E. 80 (1900).
20 For example, Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E.
68 (1905), 69 L.R.A. IOI (1906); Foster-Milburn v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120
S.W. 364 (1909), 34 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1137 (1911).

